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I. Introduction
The U.S.-Mexico Border is often considered a war zone—one
a Honduran migrant, “Ian Doe,” knows too well. 1 Ian fled his
home country of Honduras because members of narco-trafficking
gangs were coming to murder him.2 Ian was an anti-narco police
officer, and was sure that criminal gangs were trying to kill him
since the gang had accidentally murdered his brother thinking
that his brother was him.3 Before Ian could come to the United
States to seek refuge from the people out to kill him, he first had
to make his way through Mexico.4 While in Mexico, Ian was

1 Declaration of Ian Doe at 1, Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp.
3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (19-cv-00807) [hereinafter Declaration of Ian Doe].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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detained and robbed by corrupt Mexican officials, and5
witnessed rampant violence against migrants.6 For example,
some of the people Ian traveled with were killed in Mexico. 7
When Ian finally made it to the border and complied with the
immigration rules by self-reporting that he had arrived at the
border and wished to seek asylum, he was told he had to remain
in Mexico for the pendency of his case.8 Ian was justifiably afraid
for his life, not just because of the violence in Mexico, but
because he was also concerned that the people who wanted him
dead in Honduras would not have much trouble finding him in
Mexico.9
Ian’s story is commonplace at the border. Today, tens of
thousands of immigrants are fleeing violence in their home
country—often sacrificing everything they have—to seek refuge
in the United States.10 The largest groups of these immigrants
are coming from the Latin American Triangle, which is made up
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.11 Their stories are
generally different, but their similarities are significant. This is
because many are fleeing different forms of violence in their
home country, whether it be, for example: political violence
(usually affecting the indigenous); gang violence; or femicide
(the targeted killing of women).12 Also, these asylum seekers,
much like Ian, risk and face similar types of dangers for entering
and passing through Mexico.13
Id.
Id. at 4, 6.
7 Declaration of Ian Doe at 4, 6, Innovation Law Lab, 366 F. Supp. 3d
1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (19-cv-00807).
8 Id. at 5–6.
9 Id.
10 Anastasia Moloney, Latin America Grapples with Migrant Exodus that
Looks set to Worsen in 2019, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2018 1:23 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-latam-immigration-forecast-analysis/latinamerica-grapples-with-migrant-exodus-that-looks-set-to-worsen-in-2019idUSKCN1OQ0DO.
11
Julian Borger, Fleeing a Hell the US Helped Create: Why Central
Americans
Journey
North,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/19/central-america-migrantsus-foreign-policy.
12 Id.
13 Madeline Joung, ‘Do Not Travel Due to Crime and Kidnappy.’ Here’s
Where the U.S. Is Sending Asylum Seekers, TIME ONLINE (July 11, 2019),
https://time.com/5624551/remain-mexico-asylum-doctors-borders/.
5
6
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Previously, such persons would flee to a port-of-entry
somewhere along the U.S. border, declare their justified
intention to seek asylum, and be admitted into the U.S. in some
form or fashion.14 Recently, however, the United States
implemented two policies that have eliminated this option: 1)
the “Remain in Mexico policy”15, and the proliferation of “Safe
Third Country” Agreements with countries in the Latin
American Triangle.16
The “Remain in Mexico Policy,” officially known as the
“Migration Protection Protocol,” (“MPP”) requires that “asylum
seekers arriving at ports of entry on the U.S.-Mexico Border will
be returned to Mexico to wait (in Mexico) for the duration of their
U.S. Immigration Proceedings.”17 Such proceedings can take
years, and they often do.18 It is unsurprising, then, that some
asylum seekers chose to merely cross the border of the United
States to safety, rather than remain in a nation where they
continue to face the risk of persecution, life, and limb.
Further, the proliferation of “Safe Third Country”
agreements with countries in the Latin American Triangle takes
advantage of a special provision of the INA to make it impossible
for certain asylum seekers to attain asylum in the United
States.19 Safe Third Country Agreements “require migrants to
seek asylum in the countries they travel through rather than in
the United States.”20 The United States has signed these
14 Llona Bray, Can You Request Asylum At the U.S. Border?, ALLLAW
(2020), https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/us-immigration/can-you-requestasylum-border.html.
15
Bob Owen, ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy Inflicts Needless Cruelty,
HOUSTON
CHRONICLE
(Nov.
18,
2019),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Remain-inMexico-policy-inflicts-needless-14843659.php.
16 Peniel Abe, The dangers of Trump’s “safe third country” agreements in
Central America, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/dangers-trumps-safe-thirdcountry-agreements-central-america.
17
All About the “Remain in Mexico” Policy, LATIN AMERICA WORKING
GROUP, https://www.lawg.org/all-about-the-remain-in-mexico-policy/.
18 Priscilla Alvarez, Immigration Court Backlog Exceeds 1 Million Cases,
Data
Group
Says,
CNN
(Sept.
18,
2019
5:42
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/18/politics/immigration-courtbacklog/index.html.
19 Abe, supra note 16.
20 Claire Felter & Amelia Cheatham, Can ‘Safe Third Country’
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agreements with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.21
Thus, if an asylum seeker from El Salvador passes through
Guatemala (which they would need to if traveling by foot or by
car), that asylum seeker would be sent back to Guatemala to
adjudicate their asylum claim there.22 Further, this deportation
happens quickly, prior to any hearing.23 But in deporting people
from Honduras or El Salvador back to Guatemala, the policy
takes the asylum seeker “out of the frying pan and into the fire,”
as asylum seekers returned to these Latin American countries
are faced with gang violence, femicide, and ethnic violence.24
Interestingly enough, the U.S. has taken these agreements
to an even further extreme, by claiming that Mexican asylum
seekers can be sent to Guatemala instead of the United States.25
Faced with either the “Remain in Mexico” policy, or inevitably
being returned to violence under the “Safe” Third Country
Agreements, it is unsurprising that many immigrants do not
further risk their lives by crossing the border outside of a port of
entry.
Sadly, in doing so, these migrants run afoul of the criminal
law system. Specifically, the United States has two laws that
criminalize crossing the border. The first is 8 U.S.C. § 1325,
“Improper entry by alien,” which punishes illegal entry. 26 The
second is 8 U.S.C. § 1326, “Reentry of removed aliens,” which
criminalizes illegal RE-entry (the process of crossing the border
to come back to the United States), after one has already been
deported.27 An individual can face time behind bars if found
Agreements Resolve the Asylum Crisis?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug.
29, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/can-safe-third-country-agreementsresolve-asylum-crisis.
21 Nicole Narea, Trump’s Agreements in Central America are Dismantling
the Asylum System as We Know it, VOX (Nov. 20, 2019, 3:08 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2019/9/26/20870768/trump-agreement-hondurasguatemala-el-salvador-explained.
22 Felter & Cheatham, supra note 20.
23 Id.
24 Borger, supra note 11.
25 Nicole Narea, The Trump Administration will Start Sending Mexican
Asylum Seekers to Guatemala, VOX (Jan. 8, 2020, 1:40 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/8/21055282/trump-asylumguatemala-mexico-safe-third-agreement.
26 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1996).
27 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1996).
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guilty of either crime.28 Yet, many who hear the stories of people
crossing the U.S.-Mexico border may justifiably believe that the
asylum seekers committed the lesser of two evils by crossing into
the United States instead of taking on the risk of either
remaining in Mexico or being returned to the Latin American
Triangle.
This author agrees and recognizes that the law contains an
escape valve from criminal censure for such persons: the
necessity defense. This is also known as “the lesser of two evils
defense.”29 To succeed under this criminal defense, a defendant
need only convince a jury that the action they took was the lesser
of two evils.30
Thus, the thesis of this Article is that in the wake of policies
such as the “Remain in Mexico Policy” and the “Safe Third
Country Agreements,” asylum seekers, when charged with
illegal entry and re-entry, can produce enough evidence to pose
to a jury whether they are not guilty by reason of necessity. At
which point, the jury can decide whether the asylum seeker
broke the law, or instead, merely committed an act that was the
lesser of two evils. In other words, this Article presents that both
the law and the facts support putting the question of necessity
to a jury when an asylum seeker is charged with illegal entry or
illegal re-entry. The first section of this Article discusses the
illegal entry and re-entry laws, as well as their history of
enforcement. The second section reviews the necessity defense,
and describes its differences from its close cousin, the duress
defense. The third part of this Article will analyze the law as
applied to asylum seekers and present a test case that
demonstrates the strength of this defense, especially in the wake
of the U.S.’s current policies. The final section will respond to
concerns of the Article’s position.
II. Illegal Entry and Illegal Re-Entry
It is illegal to enter the United States without proper
See id.
Choice of Evils Defense Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL (2019),
https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/choice-of-evils-defense/.
30 Stephen S. Schwartz, Is there a Common Law Necessity Defense in
Federal Criminal Law?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (2008).
28
29

5
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authorization, or to re-enter the United States once one has
already been deported.31 Illegal entry is a misdemeanor, and
illegal re-entry is a felony.32 These laws have been criticized for
punishing asylum seekers and migrants since their inception,
which is no surprise, given their roots33 These laws stem from a
1929 proposal by Senator Coleman Livingston Blease of South
Carolina, who was a known white supremacist, as well as a
proponent of pro-lynching.34 This racist history is also reflected
in the laws’ current application. For example, in the 2016 fiscal
year, ninety-nine percent of individuals convicted of illegal reentry were Latino.
Since its inception, prosecutions of the law were relatively
low until the Bush Administration launched a plan to increase
the amount of prosecutions.35 This program remains today, and
is known as “Operation Streamline.”36 The goal of the program
is to fast-track asylum seekers into truncated hearings.37 For
example, “under Operation Streamline, dozens of defendants at
a time are charged, plead guilty, and ultimately convicted and
sentenced of the federal misdemeanor of illegal entry, all within
a matter of hours and sometimes even minutes.” 38 This method
of trying cases has allowed the number of prosecutions for illegal
entry to increase rapidly.39 The rapid rise is reflected in the
numbers: “40,000 in 2007, to 80,000 in 2008, rising to nearly
98,000 in 2013 under the Obama administration.”40 That means
that under the Obama Administration, for each weekday (not
excluding holidays), the United States must have prosecuted 375
cases a day.
Not to be outdone, in his first week in office, President
§ 1325; § 1326.
Id.
33 Eleanor Acer, Criminal Prosecutions and Illegal Entry: A Deeper Dive,
JUST SECURITY (July 18, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64963/criminalprosecutions-and-illegal-entry-a-deeper-dive/.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 US: Reject Mass Migrant Prosecutions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 28,
2015, 11:13 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/28/us-reject-massmigrant-prosecutions.
39 Acer, supra note 33.
40 Id.
31
32
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Trump signed an order making the prosecution of immigrationrelated crimes a “high priority,” yet again sharply increasing the
number of prosecutions.41 As part of this initiative, the Trump
Administration announced its “Zero Tolerance Policy,” which
subjected all immigrants to prosecution, even those immigrants
who arrived with children.42 As a result, over “three thousand
children were taken from parents” so their parents could be
referred for prosecution.43 It is accurate to say that the
separation of children from their parents at the border was
caused by the Trump Administration’s zealous attempt to
enforce illegal entry laws.
The illegal entry statutes have also attracted attention for
violating international law.44 Under the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, signing countries are
prohibited from punishing asylum seekers and refugees for
illegally entering the country.45 The United States has not only
ratified this treaty, but was one of the leaders in drafting it,
making the treaty binding on the United States. 46 Despite these
obligations, the Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) has
regularly referred asylum seekers for prosecution, even though
those asylum seekers who made their intentions to seek asylum
exceedingly clear.47 This practice is so widespread that the DHS
Inspector General reported in 2015 that the United States was
violating its international treaty obligations.48
Despite all of this, the law does not actually work. “[T]he
DHS Inspector General found, in its 2015 report, that CBP was
unable to demonstrate that Border Patrol referrals of
apprehended migrants for prosecution by U.S. Attorney’s Offices
actually deterred unauthorized migration.”49 Yet, the rate at
which we prosecute these offenses means resources have to be
diverted from other law enforcement efforts to handle illegal

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Acer, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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entry cases.50
In fact, the increase in enforcement of illegal entry may
actually increase instances of people attempting to enter the
U.S. As enforcement measures have increased in recent years,
the cost of smugglers has increased twelve-fold, from $1,000 to
$12,000.51 Thus, in order for families to make the journey, they
have to take out huge loans, and the “only hope of paying off
those loans is to reach the U.S., so even if they fail at their quest,
they have no choice but to try again, and again.”52
If one opposes the fast tracking of these immigration laws,
this Article’s thesis will be a welcome thought. One problem
with defending an illegal entry case is that the case is usually
cut-and-dry. Either the defendant is a citizen, or not, and either
they were apprehended in the U.S., or not. That is why it is
possible to fast track the cases so expeditiously. However, by
introducing the necessity defense into the equation, it is harder
to prosecute these cases because they become less cut-and-dry,
especially considering that defense attorneys on the border have
been surveyed saying that nearly fifty percent of their criminal
defense clients are asylum seekers.53 These defense attorneys
now have ammunition to use to protect their clients’ interests.
III. The Necessity Defense
The Necessity Defense is a type of justification defense;54
which is a type of defense that will “exculpate a person whose
conduct would otherwise be criminal when special
circumstances exist that render the conduct socially and morally
acceptable.”55 This defense first and famously appeared in
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens56, a British admiralty case from
the 1800s,57 involving four sailors who were stranded at sea for
Id.
Borger, supra note 11.
52 Id.
53 Acer, supra note 33.
54
Fatima E. Marouf, Invoking Federal Common Law Defenses in
Immigration Cases, 66 UCLA L. REV. 142, 161 (2019).
55 Id.
56 Regina v. Dudley & Stevens, 14 QBD 273 (1884).
57 Id.
50
51
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weeks.58 To survive, three of the members killed and ate one of
the other sailors after this sailor fell very ill.59 Had the sailors
not done so, all of them would have died. 60 The defendants were
eventually found not guilty by reason of necessity.61 The U.S.
Supreme Court initially applied the necessity defense in United
States v. Kirby.62 In that case, the Supreme Court found that it
would be “absurd” for a surgeon to be convicted for “dr[awing]
blood in the streets” when that surgeon had “opened the vein of
a person that fell down in the street in a fit” to save that person’s
life.63
In order to succeed on the necessity defense, a defendant
must show:
(1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and
chose the lesser evil; (2) that he acted to prevent
imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably
anticipated a causal relation between his conduct
and the harm to be avoided; and (4) that there
were no other legal alternatives to violating the
law.64
As demonstrated by United States v. Aguilar,65 this defense
can be fairly difficult, and it is especially difficult to satisfy the
last element of there being “no other legal alternatives to
violating the law.” In Aguilar, the “[a]ppellants were convicted
of masterminding and running a modern-day underground
railroad that smuggled Central American natives across the
Mexican border with Arizona.”66 This underground railroad was
made up of a series of churches that acted to give migrants

Schwartz, supra note 30, at 1259.
Michael G. Mallin, In Warm Blood: Some Historical and Procedural
Aspects of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 388 (1967).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 387.
62 Marouf, supra note 54, at 161 (citing United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S.
482, 486–87 (1868)).
63 Id.
64 United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 666.
58
59
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sanctuary.67 Then from Arizona, the migrants were sent to
Chicago so they could be dispersed throughout the United
States.68 All appellants maintained that every migrant was a
political refugee, deserving of protection under U.S. Law, yet, all
appellants also counseled the migrants they smuggled to avoid
immigration authorities, and to lie if apprehended.69 Because of
their actions and advice, they were ultimately charged with
violating federal criminal and immigration law. 70
The
appellants advanced several arguments to justify their advice,
but only one is relevant for the purposes of this article:71 that is
that the appellants had lost faith in the immigration system,
because the Immigration National Service (INS)72 failed to
approve meritorious asylum cases.73 Thus, to protect the
migrants, the appellants had no choice but to help the migrants
enter the United States, rather than put them in a position
where they may face deportation.74
The Ninth Circuit held that the appellants did not
successfully produce evidence sufficient to instruct the jury on
the necessity defense.75 Specifically, the Court held that
appellants “failed to establish that there were no other legal
alternatives.”76 The Court noted that the appellants failed to
allege any true deficiencies of the INS.77 Further, if such
deficiencies existed, appellants could have brought a civil suit to
correct those deficiencies, and such suits had succeeded in the
past.78 Relevant for this Article’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit
seems to be saying here that the system, as it existed at the time
of Aguilar, was not designed to return migrants with legitimate
claims of asylum to the harm the asylum seekers were fleeing.
Id. at 667.
Id.
69 Id.
70 Aguilar, supra note 64, at 667.
71 Id.
72
After 9/11, the Immigration National Service was dissolved and
replaced by United Citizenship Immigration Services, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.
73
Aguilar, supra note 64, at 667.
74 Id. at 692–93.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 693.
77 Id.
78 Id.
67
68
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Finally, Aguilar is relevant because it demonstrates the
highest hurdle that current migrants must overcome to
successfully allege a necessity defense. Namely, migrants must
demonstrate that they have no legal alternative by waiting for
the system to adjudicate their claims. As part II of this Article
will argue, the proliferation of the “Remain in Mexico Policy” and
“Safe Third Country Agreements” plugs this last hole, creating
justification for the necessity defense.
A. Why not the Duress Defense?
Before diving into the facts that further justify the use of the
necessity defense in the immigration context, it is important to
cover the difference between the necessity defense and the
duress defense, as some believe that these defenses are nearly
identical. For example, the elements of duress are:
that defendant was under an unlawful and
present, imminent, and impending [threat] of
such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily injury;
that defendant had not “recklessly or
negligently placed [her]self in a situation in which
it was probable that [s]he would be [forced to
choose the criminal conduct];
that defendant had no “reasonable legal
alternative to violating the law, a chance both to
refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the
threatened harm”; and
that a direct causal relationship may be
reasonably anticipated between the [criminal]
action taken and the avoidance of the [threatened]
harm.79
The most prototypical duress case is one in which a
defendant steals with a gun to his/her head, with an explicit
threat that if the defendant did not steal, whoever was holding
a gun to his/her head would shoot.
79

United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982).
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A casual observer may notice that the similarities between
the two defenses are numerous, especially the focus on
imminence of the harm, and the focus on lack of other
alternatives. However, there are three important differences.
First, while the necessity defense is a type of justification
defense, the duress defense is an “excuse defense.”80 “Unlike
justification defenses, excuse defenses do not involve a claim
that the individual acted appropriately under the
circumstances.”81 Instead, excuse defenses argue that the
defendant is not culpable for the action.82 To further examine
this, take the above classic gun-to-the-head example. Under the
duress defense, the thief may argue that he/she knew stealing
was wrong, but he/she had no choice because he/she objectively
believed that he/she would be shot and killed if he/she did not
steal. Thus, the defendant is not culpable.
Second, and importantly for this Article, duress tends to
result from the actions of individuals or concerted actions, while
necessity tends to arise from environmental or circumstantial
factors.83 If the actions are shared among persons, duress occurs
when the group shares a specific goal. This is embodied in the
fourth element of duress, which requires a direct causal
relationship with the anticipated harm. However, in the case of
necessity, the groups of persons may not share a specific goal,
even if their actions tend to force the defendant to commit the
crime.
Alternatively, necessity may arise from entirely
environmental factors, such as the classic stranded-at-sea
example. Thus, the coercion need not be as direct for the
necessity defense as the duress defense. This is significant
because immigrants fleeing across the U.S. Border are most
often influenced by a confluence of environmental factors, as
opposed to immediate and concerted threats or use of force.84
This is also significant for duress because the action usually
must be a focused use of force or threat of violence.85 In this way,
Marouf, supra note 54, at 165.
Id.
82 Id.
83 Necessity and Duress, LAWSHELF, https://lawshelf.com/courseware/
entry/necessity-and-duress (last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
84 See Borger, supra note 11.
85 Necessity and Duress, supra note 83.
80
81
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duress gives the jury something similar to a straightforward rule
to apply. If there is a direct threat of force, then the defendant
is not guilty. However, necessity could be based on any number
of environmental factors, meaning that it is closer to something
like a standard than a rule.86 Thus, a jury has more power to
judge the outside influences in a necessity case than they would
in a duress case. Such ambiguity could be beneficial in a period
of time when immigrants are heavily discriminated against
because it allows juries, as members of the community, to act as
a safety valve against overzealous prosecution of immigration
related crimes, when such crimes are used against persons who
have fled a confluence of atrocities outside of their control.
B. What must the defendant show to get the Necessity
Defense in front of a jury?
Before going further, it is important to discuss the necessity
defense’s burden of production, in order to understand how such
a defense can be provided to a jury. A burden of production is the
“party’s obligation to come forward with sufficient evidence to
support a particular proposition of fact. Satisfying the burden of
production may also be referred to as establishing a prima facie
case.”87 This is different than a burden of proof, which is what
the jury uses to ultimately weigh if the defendant has
sufficiently provided evidence to prove a fact in court.88
The standard that courts apply to determine if this burden
is met is that “a party is not entitled to a charge unless the
record, viewed most charitably to the proponent of the
instruction, furnishes an arguable basis for application of the
proposed rule of law.”89 For example, in United States v.
Rodriguez, the government charged the defendant with multiple
counts of drug related crimes.90 The defendant met an informant

Schwartz, supra note 30, at 1261.
Burden
of
Production,
CORNELL
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/burden_of_production, (last visited Mar. 14,
2020).
88
Burden
of
Proof,
CORNELL
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/burden_of_proof (last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
89 United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 813 (1st Cir. 1988).
90 Id. at 810.
86
87
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for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the
informant testified that the defendant intended to acquire a kilo
of cocaine.91 The defendant claimed that the informant initially
asked him for drugs, and that the defendant told the informant
that he did not have or knew where to acquire drugs.92 The
defendant claimed that the undercover informant was very
pushy, and only after pressure did the defendant give in.93 The
two eventually had a series of calls where the defendant agreed
to sell the informant a kilo of cocaine.94 During the sale, the
defendant was arrested.95
The government then charged the defendant with the sale
of the drugs, and during the trial, the defendant attempted to
get a jury instruction for entrapment.96 Afterwards, the district
judge denied the instruction,97 The First Circuit, on review,
recognized that “[i]t is hornbook law that an accused is entitled
to an instruction on his theory of defense so long as the theory is
a valid one and there is evidence in the record to support it.” 98
When applying this rule, the district courts cannot weigh
evidence or make credibility findings; instead they must
“examine the evidence of record and the inferences reasonably
to be drawn therefrom to see if the proof, taken most hospitably
to the accused, can plausibly support the theory of defense.” 99
Therefore, it requires examining the bare “legal sufficiency” of
the evidence.100 In Rodriguez, the court vacated and remanded
the defendant’s case, because if the district court took the
hospitable view of the evidence, then the defendant could have
been entrapped.101 Thus, the defendant had met his burden of
production.
IV. The Asylee-Defendant
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id. at 811.
Id.
Id.
Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 811–12.
Id. at 812.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 812.
Id.
Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 815.
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– Trigger Warning –
This section contains descriptions of violence against women,
including murder and kidnapping.
This section will discuss the general conditions of people
that are typically charged with illegal entry and illegal re-entry
and apply those facts to the legal standard. Several books can,
and have, been written about this subject, but this Article will
attempt to provide a broader perspective.
By providing
background facts, this Article will make clear the confluence of
factors that could lead people to flee from Central America, as
well as what factors could be raised when arguing the necessity
defense.
A. The Violence in Central America that leads asylum
seekers to flee their country
The vast majority of people crossing into the United States
come from the countries of the Latin American Triangle:
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These nations share
several problems, most notably a fairly recent history of military
conflict.102 In 1996, Guatemala ended a long and bloody civil war
that raged for more than 40 years and took over 200,000 lives.103
El Salvador also suffered a long and bloody civil war that ended
in the 1990s.104 Although Honduras did not have a civil war in
the 1990s, it has instead been struck with more recent political
conflict.105 In 2009, the military of Honduras seized the
president and flew him out of the country.106 Important land
dispute resolutions destabilized without the president.107 The
land dispute conflicts became militarized, and hundreds were
killed.108
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
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The United States was involved in each conflict.109 In
Guatemala, the United States Central Intelligence Agency
added fuel to the conflict when it overthrew the democraticallyelected president.110 In El Salvador, the U.S. “train[ed] and
fund[ed] rightwing death squads in the name of fighting
communism.”111 In Honduras, the United States supported the
efforts that ousted the president.112
Besides outright military conflict, the countries in Latin
America are also suffering from an epidemic of violent crime and
gang violence.113 “Latin America is home to about eight percent
of the world’s population but has about one-third of its
homicides—in 2016, that meant some 400 homicides a day, or
roughly 146,000 a year.”114 In the wake of the civil wars that
plagued the region, maras, or street gangs, took root.115
Exacerbation of socio-economic problems, such as poverty,
ostracized portions of the population, helping solidify the power
of such gangs.116 Additionally, mass deportations from the
United States to Latin America helped street gangs form.117 For
example, the MS-13, one of the most infamous street gangs,
started as a low level youth street gang in Los Angeles.118 In the
wake of mass deportations under the Clinton Administration,
Id.
Amy Bracken, Why You Need to Know about Guatemala’s Civil War,
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114 Christopher Woody, 400 murders a day: 10 reasons why Latin America
is the world’s most violent place, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 10, 2019 8:47 AM),
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https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/26/16955936/ms-13-trumpimmigrants-crime.
118 Id.
109
110

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/2

16

2020

NOT NECESSARILY UNLAWFUL

71

the criminal enterprise was exported to Latin America.119
These street gangs started with minor acts of extortion.120
However, this extortion has evolved into a large criminal
enterprise, becoming one of the main sources of revenue for
many criminal organizations in the Latin American Triangle.121
For example, in Honduras “some seventy-nine percent of
registered small businesses . . . and eighty percent of the
country’s informal traders report they are extorted.”122
Likewise, in El Salvador, seventy percent of businesses are
extorted.123
Another major source of crime in this region is narcotrafficking.124 At one point, large gangs and governments had
complete control over drug routes to the United States. But over
time, the strength of large narco-trafficking organizations
waned.125 As a result, smaller gangs began to form, controlling
certain trafficking routes, and fighting with other gangs for
territory.126 Innocent people are often caught up in these power
struggles, either simply as bystanders caught in the wrong place
at the wrong time, or because these people have some interest
(such as property or wealth) that the gangs want to acquire to
help in the gang’s battle with its rival drug gangs.127 Again, it is
worth noting that since much of the drug conflict is caused by
narco-trafficking, the United States should share some of the
blame because it is a large source of the demand for these
trafficked drugs.128
These gangs have further been entrenched by attempted
efforts to weaken their hold on Latin America.129 Governments
in the Latin American Triangle have tried to implement mano
Id.
Briscoe & Keseberg, supra note 115.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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126 Briscoe & Keseberg, supra note 115.
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128 Daniel Hatoum, America’s Modern Day Internment Camps: The Law
of War and the Refugees of Central America’s Drug Conflict, 21 TEX. J. ON CIV.
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dura (iron fist) policies—”Cero Tolerancia in Honduras, Plan
Mano Dura in El Salvador, and Plan Escoba in Guatemala”—
leading to indiscriminate mass arrests of thousands of alleged
gang members.130 However, such policies have only fed the
feelings of frustration that fueled criminal violence in the region
in the first place.131 Further, decisions to segregate imprisoned
gang members by group, which originally seemed like a
necessity to prevent in-fighting within the prison, actually
allowed maras to better organize in prisons, helping them to
evolve into more sophisticated criminal organizations.132 For
example, “segregation allowed the gangs to turn the prisons into
their own criminal fiefdoms and bases of both internal and
external operations, facilitating the development of a gang
hierarchy where power flowed down from incarcerated gang
leaders.”133
Violence in the Latin American Triangle is particularly
dangerous for women.134 For example, “femicide—the targeted
killing of a woman, particularly by a man, due to her gender—
plagues much of Latin America and the Caribbean.”135 Femicide
is particularly prevalent in the Latin American Triangle.136 As
one author states, “despite these countries’ comparatively small
population (just five percent of the region’s total population),
together, the three countries rank third in terms of the largest
total number of femicides, with 1,804 deaths in 2016 alone.”137
Honduras has the highest femicide rate in the world.138 In El
Salvador, the country saw femicide rates double in 2013.139 El
Id.
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Salvador’s murder rate is more than six times that of the U.S.,
and Guatemala’s numbers track closely with those of El
Salvador.140 Gang violence can explain some of this harm, with
many of the major gangs developing a culture that encourages
the kidnapping, rape, and beating of young women.141 While
some of the violence can be attributed to gang activity, it does
not account for all the violence , or even, most of it. 142
“Specialists studying violent crimes in Central America say the
killing of women often comes at the hands of their partners.”143
In more than half of the cases of slain women, the murderer was
a partner, an ex-partner, a family member or an acquaintance.144
These deaths are often gruesome as well: “whereas men are
often shot to death [in Latin America], women are killed with
particular viciousness.”145 According to a 2015 Salvadorian
government study, female victims were tortured in a number of
ways: having their fingers cut off, being raped, being tied up, or
being burnt.146 Many of the people fleeing to the United States
from the Latin American Triangle are women attempting to flee
specific violence directed against them because of their
gender.147
The volatility of the Central American Triangle also puts
the LGBT+ community at lethal risk of violence, due to the
discrimination that members of already face.148 Among LGBT+
asylum seekers, eighty-eight percent faced gender-based or
sexual violence in their home country.149 Once again, gang
violence exacerbates the violence against this community.
There are also a number of reasons why the crime in Latin
America likely will not substantially subside. Inequality
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problems are still rampant, with unemployment remaining
extremely high.150 These problems often correlate highly with an
increase in homicide and petty crime.151 Further, lack of
investment in education systems creates poor school systems
that also exacerbates inequality and crime.152 Violence has
become widespread among people looking for a solution to the
crises in Latin American Triangle countries.153 Vigilantism has
taken root in Latin America, because ordinary citizens feel that
they can take the enforcement of law into their own hands, and
combat violence with violence.154 A proliferation of weapons
following armed conflicts in the region encourages the use of
violence, and makes vigilantism easy to execute. The groups
that have been provided weapons to end political conflict often
devolve into criminal enterprises that extort the very people
they had originally set out to protect.155 There is also a high level
of corruption in Latin America, with criminal gangs infiltrating
many levels of the police and government.156 As a result,
criminal organizations can act with a high level of impunity.
Outside of the crime described above, there is also violence,
sometimes state directed, against ethnic minorities, especially
indigenous people.157 This creates another subset of asylum
seekers from the Latin American Triangle. Specifically, the
spread of extractive industries, militarization, paramilitarism,
and organized crime has created a conflict with the indigenous
population in the Latin American Triangle for land. 158 Such
protests against extractive competition by indigenous persons
are met with resistance from the governments.159 At its worst,
government military groups have used sexual violence as a tool
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displace indigenous persons.160
For example, Guatemala experienced a genocide against the
indigenous Mayan people during its long civil conflict.161 Many
activists are concerned that in recent conflicts over resources
and land, the country is returning to a culture of violence against
Mayans.162 In 2019, there were a series of high profile killings
of native activists.163 Yet, the government of Guatemala has
refused to condemn the murders, or even meet with the
indigenous persons in an effort to discuss the uptick in
violence.164 In response to this ethnic violence, sociologist
Edelberto Torres-Rivas told NPR, “[i]t’s no surprise that we
see . . . tens of thousands of Guatemalans fleeing the country
going into Mexico trying to get to the United States to flee a
country that is in free-fall–where there are no guarantees and
there is no security.”165
People from Mexico are fleeing to the United States for
similar reasons that people are fleeing from the Latin American
Triangle.166 Typically, Mexican asylum seekers are fleeing
cartel violence, which actually includes organized crime groups
that tend to be larger and more powerful than the street gangs
of Central America.167 Ethnic violence is also rampant.168
Mexico has a high amount of gender violence, similar to the
violence found in Central America.169 In other words, the
problems faced by asylum seekers coming from Mexico are
similar, if not the exact same, as the problems faced by the
majority of asylum seekers coming from the Latin American
Triangle.
This demonstrates how remaining in Mexico is not a safe
Id.
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option for people coming from the Latin American Triangle.170
First, these migrants are entering a nation where they could face
the very problems they were fleeing from in their home country.
Second, migrants passing through Mexico are frequently
extorted, robbed, attacked, and even kidnapped by virtue of their
status as migrants.171 In addition, rape is also a frequent
occurrence.172 This puts women fleeing femicide in a vulnerable
position once more. Also, members of the LGBT+ community are
extremely vulnerable, with two-thirds of such persons suffering
sexual and gender based violence when they travel through
Mexico.173 While theoretically there should be protections in
place for migrants attempting to flee their home country and
who are afraid of remaining in Mexico, under the MPP program
implemented by the Trump Administration, such persons are
typically returned to Mexico despite their well-founded fears.174
In fact, the CBP has regularly sent people back to Mexico who
were not only afraid, but also have already faced persecution
because of their status as migrants.175
All of this background is important because it demonstrates
the type of dangers that asylum seekers face, both in their home
countries, as well as when they attempt to reach the United
States via travel through Mexico. From this background, we can
confirm that cases involving illegal entry of asylum seekers
typically stem from sustained violence in the asylum seeker’s
home country and a high risk of violence when passing through
Mexico. Thus, the best way to test the application of the
necessity defense to an asylum seeker would be to select the
asylum seeker based on the typical criteria, and then apply the
law to that case.
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V. Applying the Necessity Defense
Based on both the law and the facts, the necessity defense
should at least be given as a jury instruction for asylum seekers
who have been charged with illegal entry. In order to help the
reader understand this more clearly, this section provides an
example of a typical Latin American asylum seeker, and then
applies the necessity defense to their situation. Luckily, this
Article already contains such a person, Ian Doe (our protagonist
from the Introduction).176 To briefly reiterate the facts of his
case, Ian was a victim of sustained gang violence due to his role
as an anti-narco police officer in Honduras.177 His brother had
been killed in Ian’s place, leading Ian to flee his country.178
However, while traveling through Mexico, his companions were
also killed, and Ian himself suffered violence at the hands of
corrupt Mexican officials.179 It is also important to note here
that when Ian tried to apply for asylum in the United States, he
was sent back to Mexico under the MPP.180
Now, let us assume that instead of remaining in Mexico
after being sent back, Ian crossed the border illegally into the
United States by walking across a shallow section of the Rio
Grande River. Next, let us assume that a CBP official watched
Ian cross the border into the United States, arrested him after
he crossed the border, and then referred him to prosecution. Let
us further assume that Ian has no previous deportations, and is
thus charged with illegal entry. Ian decides to forgo any plea
(likely because it would lead to his deportation back to Honduras
where he will be killed), and instead opts to go to trial. His
attorney has him testify to all of the above facts in the hopes of
advancing the necessity defense. His defense attorney must
show, in conjunction with the facts listed above, that there is
enough evidence sufficient to instruct the jury on the necessity
defense.
In other words, his defense attorney must show that (1)
when Ian crossed the border he was faced with a choice of two
176
177
178
179
180
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evils, and chose the lesser evil; (2) Ian acted to prevent imminent
harm; (3) Ian reasonably anticipated a causal relationship
between his conduct and the harm to be avoided; and (4) (and
perhaps most importantly) there were no other legal
alternatives available to avoid violating the law. To meet the
burden in order to get the necessity defense in front of the jury,
Ian’s defense attorney must demonstrate that the record, when
“viewed most charitable” to Ian, contains sufficient evidence that
the defense could be applicable.
The first three elements are easily disposed of based on the
record in Ian’s case. When Ian crossed the border, he was faced
with two evils: either (1) he could cross into the United States,
committing a misdemeanor, or (2) he could remain in Mexico and
hope to continually evade the threat of violence and death.
Considering the likely threat on his life, a jury could reasonably
conclude that Ian chose the lesser of two evils when he
committed a victimless misdemeanor.
Next, the record indicates that the threat was indeed
imminent. Far from being a speculated harm, Ian’s fear of
remaining in Mexico was real, pervasive, and prevalent. He had
already been personally attacked, with several of his traveling
companions already having been killed during their journey
through Mexico. Ian was merely waiting for his number to be
up, and thus, a jury could easily conclude that the threat of
violence was imminent as well. Further, the threat of violence
was imminent if Ian returned or was sent back to his home
country because gang members had already tried to kill him.
Third, Ian also reasonably believed he would be safe in the
United States. This is because the United States has a stronger
and more protective legal system which he could rely on when
fleeing violence from both his home country and Mexico. While
there was a possibility he could still be faced violence in the
United States, someone crossing the border could infer that this
was far less likely, and thus, a jury could conclude that the third
element is met.
Therefore, we are only left with the fourth element of the
claim, which is whether there are any legal alternatives to
violating the law. As discussed earlier, this has often been the
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most difficult element to overcome.181 As the Aguilar case noted,
asylum seekers at one time had a legal alternative to crossing
the border.182 That alternative was to present themselves at a
port-of-entry, and then wait in the United States for the
pendency of their asylum claim. If the asylum seeker was truly
seeking refuge from imminent and life-threatening harm, then
they (likely)183 had a strong asylum claim, and would not only
remain in the U.S. during the pendency of their claim, but also
could succeed on their claim and attain U.S. citizenship.
However, the adoption of the MPP, a.k.a. the “Remain in
Mexico Policy,” and the adoption of Safe Third Countries
Agreements has eliminated this legal alternative. Under the
MPP policy, if Ian presents himself at the border, instead of
being allowed in the U.S., he is forced to return to Mexico, where
he continues to face threats of violence and death.184 In reality,
Ian did try to present himself at a port-of-entry and was
subsequently sent back to Mexico under the MPP. 185 Thus, Ian’s
legal alternative, the legal alternative that was damning for the
defendant’s in Aguilar, is not available. Accordingly, a jury
could conclude that Ian only had one option left, which was to
cross into the United States without presenting himself at the
border. Since a jury could reasonably draw this conclusion, the
defense should be put before the jury in the form of a jury
instruction.
It is also worth noting that although Ian was sent back to
Mexico, it was possible for the United States, under its Safe
Third Country Agreements, to send him to Guatemala and force
him to seek asylum there. But this creates the same problem as
the MPP in that it forces Ian to go to a country where he faces
an imminent threat of danger and death, especially as a police
officer who fought gang members in Central America. This is
especially true considering that the same gangs operate in both
Guatemala and Honduras, and thus, Ian would be returning to
Supra Sec. I.
See Aguilar, supra note 64, at 693.
183 This author is highly sympathetic to the position that even under the
pre-Trump era system, asylum seekers were generally still treated unfairly.
However, not so unfair as to persuade the courts. This piece’s advocacy is that
the system has become so unfair, that the courts must take another look.
184 Declaration of Ian Doe, supra note 1.
185 Id.
181
182
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the very people he was attempting to flee in the first place.
Therefore, even under slightly different facts, where Ian is
returned pursuant to the Safe Third Countries Agreements, he
would still be able to show that he has no legal alternatives to
escape these threats of violence and death. Thus, the necessity
defense should still be placed in front of the jury.
By examining the facts of Ian’s case, it demonstrates that
an asylum seeker fleeing violence should be able to advance the
necessity defense. While gang violence is one major problem
that an asylum seeker may flee from, as discussed above, there
are many other reasons why people from Central America have
been fleeing to the United States. Any or all of these reasons
can form the basis of a necessity defense, because what ties these
instances together is that people are fleeing immediate threats
of violence or death, and such persons cannot remain safe in
Mexico. In other words, while facts may differ from case-to-case,
the reality is that this defense will be open to the many asylum
seekers who are fleeing to the United States and being forced to
remain in Mexico or Central America for the pendency of their
claims.
VI. Response to Concerns
This final section addresses specific concerns to the position
advanced by this Article that have not already been addressed.
First, opponents of the thesis of this paper may point out that
while this Article’s argument may hold true for illegal entry, it
should not hold true for illegal RE-entry. These opponents would
indicate that illegal re-entry only applies when an immigrant
has already been deported. 186 Since such immigrants have
already been deported, this implies that these specific
immigrants also do not have a valid asylum claim, or otherwise
they would have asserted that claim at their initial deportation.
Finally, without a valid asylum claim, there could not be an
“imminent threat” that the immigrant is fleeing, and therefore,
they should be unable to prove one of the elements of the
necessity defense.
However, the flaw with this argument is that it makes two
186
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fatal assumptions: first, it assumes that the circumstances of an
immigrant did not change after deportation, and second, that the
immigrant had the tools to assert the claim in the first place.
The first assumption is fairly flawed because the situation in
Central America is so unstable that the person who was
deported could be faced with a new and different life-threatening
situation. For example, someone who previously had not
attracted the ire of a gang may finally be caught in the crosshairs
after she returns to her initial country again. In fact, American
immigration law recognizes this, since it allows a person who
has previously been deported to seek a form of asylum relief by
demonstrating that they cannot safely be returned to their
country.187
Second, it is not true that immigrants always have the tools
to assert the asylum claim in the first place. The following is the
epitome of the understatement that the asylum-immigration
system is complicated.188 As a result, the system is very difficult
to navigate without the assistance of a lawyer.189 For example,
prior to being placed before an immigration court, an immigrant
must first participate in an interview with an asylum officer to
determine whether the immigrant has a substantial likelihood
of succeeding on their asylum claim.190 During this interview,
the asylum officer will be listening for specific information to try
and determine the validity of the asylum claim. 191 The
immigrant, however, will not usually know what information
they should present, or may leave out details that would
otherwise be helpful for their case, out of fear that it may weaken
their claim.192 This is only the first pitfall that the asylum
seeker could fall prey to while trying to navigate the complicated
187
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) (2006) (statute allowing for withholding of removal).
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asylum system, ultimately leading to the failure of a valid
asylum claim in which the immigrant truly faces an imminent
threat.193 Yet, many asylum seekers cannot obtain (or afford)a
lawyer, therefore leading to deportation.194 This undermines the
second assumption that is fatal to the illegal re-entry argument.
Another potential criticism of this Article’s thesis is that it
invites jury nullification. For example, “jury nullification is the
power that jurors have to find a defendant not guilty even if they
think that he committed the crime, . . . it is a power that comes
from the Bill of Rights, which says that a person cannot be tried
for the same crime twice.” 195 Critics of this Article might argue
that the necessity defense merely provides a hook to legitimize
jury nullification by jurors who disagree with the United States
current enforcement of immigration policies.
In responding to this criticism, first, this contention
assumes that jurors who find a defendant not guilty by reason of
necessity must necessarily have an improper motive. However,
as previously stated, it is possible to find that this defense
applies to facts of the typical asylum seeker. As with any
defense, because of double jeopardy, jurors could abuse the
defense to serve political ends. That does not mean the defense
should not be presented to the juror when the burden of
production can be met. In fact, the burden of production exists
for the purpose of being a check to prevent rampant jury
nullification. Thus, the concern of jury nullification is heavily
mitigated.
Second, this contention makes an assumption that jury
nullification is somehow a terrible result. There are numerous
benefits of jury nullification.
First and foremost, jury
nullification can be a powerful protest tool to force change to a
system that the political system has tried, and consistently
failed, to change for years, such as the immigration system. 196 In
fact, jury nullification has a long history of forcing positive
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changes to the laws. For example, “there are famous cases,
including the [John Peter] Zenger case, in which American
patriots were charged with sedition against the British crown,
and jurors nullified in those cases because they thought that the
law was unfair.”197 It has also been wielded in the civil rights
field. Historically, “in cases involving fugitive slaves: When
people were prosecuted for trying to help a slave escape, those
folks were prosecuted. And in the North, the jurors would
nullify.”198 In more recent years, jury nullification has been used
to prevent the conviction of persons charged criminally for
having consensual gay sex.199 Therefore, to assume jury
nullification is a terrible result one flawed from a historical
perspective.
Additionally, jury nullification can provide a system of
checks and balances to the current mass system of immigration
prosecution. The whole purpose of a “trial by jury” is to balance
the authoritarian power of the state. Yet, in the United States,
not even a judge can overturn a not-guilty verdict (although a
judge may for a guilty verdict). This gives the citizens of the
state the ability to balance the power of the state. Further, in
doing so through jury nullification, the jurors can provide this
check without detection, and therefore, not be concerned about
attracting the ire of an authoritarian state. Thus, jury
nullification itself is not bad, as the contention assumes, because
it can serve as a powerful check on authoritarianism.
Lastly, critics of this Article may advance one final
defensive position which is that the significance of this Article
will only last for the current political moment, due to the Trump
Administration’s current implementation of the MPP and Safe
Third Country Agreements. While it is true that this Article’s
thesis focuses on the implementation of these policies, anyone
who advances this criticism against this Article is missing the
broader and more salient point: when laws are rewritten to
create new pressures on weak and vulnerable groups, other
areas of the law will often step in to create a safety valve. This
Article is an example of this principle because it illustrates how
attempts to create pressure against asylum seekers can, and
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should, trigger a safety valve in another area of the law to
protect these very same persons.
Law is a human invention, and it is impossible to remove
humanity from the law. This Article’s thesis demonstrates that
even the most obvious and powerful attempts to strip
compassion out of our legal system will end in failure. That
significance does not end with our current political moment.
VII. Conclusion
The United States is inarguably going through a
particularly noteworthy time in its history of treatment towards
immigrants, especially asylum seekers. As a backdrop to this
moment, the United States currently has two statutes that
punish asylum seekers for crossing the border into the United
States. Because many asylum seekers’ only option is to cross the
border or be returned to their home country in either Latin
America or Mexico—where they face threats of life or limb—the
asylum seekers are really left with only one choice, which is to
violate U.S. criminal law. This Article suggests that since no
viable options remain, the necessity defense should step in to fill
in the legal gap. After all, ever since Ian Doe had been targeted
by criminal gangs in his home country, his life was a series of
terrible events all leading to the moment he arrived at the U.S.
border. Jurors already have the tool they need to stop an
additional evil from perpetuating against someone who
seemingly has no other choice. Ian Doe should know it is his
right to use the necessity defense, and defense attorneys should
teach juries that our law is capable of halting the parade of evils
asylum seekers face.
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